Abstract: In this paper I explore the possibility of explaining why there is such a thing as the good in naturalistic terms. More specifically, I seek an explanation of the fact that some things are good-for human beings and the other animals in the final sense of good: worth aiming at. I trace the existence of the final good to the existence of conscious agents. I propose that the final good for an animal is her own well-functioning as the kind of creature she is, taken as an end of action, and that having this as her final good makes her better at the activity she is necessarily engaged in, namely living.
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4 therefore how it goes about doing those things, who knows its function. To take another example, anyone might say that the purpose of a heart is to pump blood, but it is the cardiologist, who knows how the heart does that, who knows the function of the heart. This concept of function is what makes it plausible for Aristotle to identify the form of a substance with its function (Metaphysics VII.10 1035a17), while at the same time holding that the form of a substance is what the scientific knower grasps and from which she can reason to explain other things about the substance (Metaphysics VII.7 
1032a). It is in the sense of 'how it does
what it does' that we can view a biological organism as having a function, which is roughly speaking, how it goes about living -that is, staying alive and reproducing.
Each kind of organism has its own characteristic way of going about those tasks, and in that sense each kind of organism has its own function.
In fact, once we have the distinction between 'purpose' and 'how a thing does what it does' we can read the distinction back even onto the most simple substances. What is the purpose of a shelf? To store things on. How does it do that? By providing a flat surface to store things on. That second thing is the shelf's function, the how-it-does-what-it-does. It is what makes a shelf different from other forms of storage like crates and vases, that work by providing appropriately shaped receptacles to store things in, rather than flat surfaces to store them on.
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But here a warning is in order. It is tempting to think that 'how-a-thing-doeswhat-it-does' is a more naturalistic notion than 'purpose.' This is because it might seem as if there is a plain fact of the matter about how a thing does what it does, while there is no plain fact of the matter about what its purpose is. The purpose is, as it were, in the eyes of the beholder. Certainly, there does seem to be a plain matter of fact, indeed of scientific fact, about how an organism goes about living. If we think that a thing's function is how-it-does-what-it-does, and that functional goodness means having properties that enable a thing to perform its function well, we may then be tempted to conclude that functional goodness is a natural notion.
But of course naturalism cannot be bought so cheaply. The difficulty is that the 'what it does' in the formula 'how-it-does-what-it-does' is still in the eye of the beholder. Suppose that, screwing around with some mechanical parts, I create a little device like a wind-up toy that can move forward autonomously on a surface. 3 But I insist that that is not its purpose, and that in fact it has no purpose. Perhaps I constructed it by accident, while engaged in a kind of mechanical doodling. 4 Now This is one reason why the movements of rivers, tectonic plates, forest fires, and erupting volcanoes do not count as things they do in the sense that gives rise to standards of functional goodness. 5 We do not say of such things that they are functioning well or badly. Or at least, we don't unless we view them as performing some sort of an ecological service. We might think of the forest fire as burning off the brush so that the forest can renew itself, or the river as providing habitat for a certain kind of marine life. Then a fire that burns out too quickly or a sluggish river might be doing badly. This is all just a way of belaboring the obvious: the notion of 5 Some readers will demur about some of these cases, for two reasons. The first is that we are tempted to think that rivers are flowing well and fires are burning well when they are flowing or burning in a way that makes them likely to keep flowing or burning. This is because we transfer a thought that is natural to have about living things to these non-living phenomena. Living things are living well when they are living in a way that makes it likely that they will keep living. The other reason is even more primitive. People may be tempted to think a fire is burning well or a volcano is erupting well when they are doing whatever they do vigorously. If I said a volcano was erupting feebly, someone might think I was criticizing it. I will not venture an explanation of that one. clear that there is some sense in which they perceive it as a potential nesting place.
These are animals who need nesting places just as we need places to sit down, and, like us, they view the world through the eyes of their needs. When they build their own nests, their movements are guided by some sense of how the nest is to be used. The exact sense in which it is correct to say that an animal sees something as a possible home -the form that that perception takes in his or her mental lifeprobably varies with the degree and kind of cognitive sophistication of the animal in question. So when we say that a bluebird sees a birdhouse as a possible nesting place, and when we say that a termite sees your house as a possible nesting place, we may be talking about rather different things, different things going on in the mental lives of these animals. But they are things that serve a similar function -a function that is similar to the function that the concept of a home plays in our mental lives.
The reason this matters is that we don't want to say that things are only finally good or bad in the perspective of rational or conceptualizing agents. Final good and bad exist in the perspective of any agent who is trying to achieve something in particular and has some idea what he or she is doing. 6 Obviously, the idea applies most clearly to rational agents, who say to ourselves that such-and-such is what we are trying to achieve, and such-and-such is the way to go about it. of degree. Suppose a fish's instincts tell it to snap at a disturbance on the surface of the lake. In the world in which the fish evolved, such disturbances are nearly always caused by edible insects. This particular disturbance is caused by a piece of litter that some human slob just threw into the water. It is not something to eat, so the fish spits it out. The really dumb fish may just snap at it again as it moves along the surface of the water. The smarter fish moves on. The smarter fish then has some idea, however dim, that he is looking for something to eat, and the litter didn't answer to that idea. On up from there to lions who coordinate their movements so that they are approaching the wildebeest from every side, or to Sultan the chimpanzee who stacks up crates to reach the high-hanging bananas, to Alex the language-trained parrot who said 'I want a nut' when he wanted a nut (Köhler, 1924 (Köhler, /2013 Pepperberg 2000) . What we have here is a matter of degree. Even if animals do not use the concept of a final good or a goal, they do something that to varying degrees is functionally like being guided by the concept of a final good or a goal and how to achieve it. And recognizing that, we can use the concept of a final good or a goal on their behalf. (Moore, 1903 (Moore, , 1922 .
Supporters of the other views have been accused of doing so as well. To the extent that the accusation is justified, I believe the problem here is that supporters of these theories tend to suppose that these things are worth pursuing because they are good. Indeed, the objective list theorist seems to be pretty much stuck with that conclusion.
On a constructivist account, the reverse should be true: we should deem things to be good because they are worth pursuing, rather than being worth pursuing because they are good. Constructivist accounts generally have this structure. Consider some comparisons. T. M. Scanlon thinks actions are not unjustifiable because they are wrong, but rather wrong because they are unjustifiable (Scanlon, 1998 ). The kind of relationship which Scanlon thinks we have reason to want to stand in with others demands that we act in ways that we can justify to them. We can use the words 'right' and 'wrong' as placeholders for whatever it is enables us to do that or not to do it, or when we want to conceptualize or announce someone's success or failure in acting justifiably.
Immanuel Kant thinks actions are not contrary to law because they are wrong, but wrong because they are contrary to law -that is, they cannot be universalized desire he or she most wants. Since the view that subjective satisfaction is the good is implausible, I
am taking this sort of theory in the second sense.
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17 (Kant, 1785 (Kant, /1998 . As autonomous beings we must govern our conduct by laws we make for ourselves, and we use the words 'right' and 'wrong' as placeholders when we ask how to do that, or to announce success and failure in doing it. In a similar way, we have the concept of the good because we have to figure out what to pursue or aim for, and part of that is figuring out what is worth pursuing or aiming for. Since that is the problem, the good should be whatever solves that problem, and the problem is solved when we find something worth pursuing.
You may think that 'good' and 'worth pursuing' are ideas so close to each other that we have no hope of using one of them to determine the content of the other.
How do we determine what is worth pursuing, if it is not by first
determining what is good? Looked at from this point of view, the more 'naturalistic' of the extant theories of final good, the ones that identify the good with pleasure or the object of desire, do appear to have at least made it to the starting point. Things that are pleasant or desirable at least appear to be worth pursuing to those who experience or expect to experience the pleasure or to those who have the relevant desires. They beckon; they summon an agent to action. Indeed, it may be argued that that's what it is to desire something or find it pleasant: for it to look worth pursuing, and in that sense to look good. As Aristotle puts it:
To perceive then is like bare asserting or knowing; but when the object is pleasant or painful, the soul makes a quasi-affirmation or negation, and pursues or avoids the object. To feel pleasure or pain is to act with the sensitive mean towards what is good or bad as such.
(On the Soul III.7 431a7-11)
So perhaps all we need to ask is whether there is any reason to believe these appearances are true, or to put the point more generally although more vaguely, whether we have some other ground for endorsing them.
I believe that there is, but I cannot even begin to defend the answer here. All and to find the things that are functionally bad for them aversive. In other words, animals are designed in such a way that they tend to take the things that are functionally good for them as final goods, in the sense that they find them attractive and aim for them, and to reject the things that are functionally bad for them as bad in the final sense in the sense that they find them aversive and try to avoid them.
These appearances, however, are highly defeasible, and can be correct or incorrect. 12 So something that appears worth pursuing is only actually worth pursuing if pursuing and obtaining it really does contributes to the functional success of the animal. Actions and ends are good for her if they make the animal good at living in the way characteristic of her kind. That is what it means for something to appear in an animal's mental life as her goal. That would explain why, for instance, the fox desists from pursuing the rabbit when doing so brings him too near to the humans or the wolves.
I would like to argue here that we know that something along these lines is roughly true of people. When people learn that something that attracts them is likely to kill them, they desist from pursuing it or at least think that they ought to. we are subject to moral as well as physical death: we can feel to meet the standards that, from our own point of view, make our lives worth living and our actions worth undertaking. 13 The second is that I would have to make a case against clear-eyed akrasia, so that you cannot simply reply that it is not true that we avoid things that we know are bad for us.
13 For the notion of practical identity see The Sources of Normativity, especially Lecture 3, and SelfConstitution, 1.4, pp. 18-26.
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The more complicated argument is to show that there is something right about an agent's pursuing the goal of living, or some other reason to endorse it.
One possibility would be to argue that there is no point of view from which the agent could possibly be wrong. Agency places us in the normative realm, and once we are there, there is no way to refute the claim that something that we take to be good for us is not actually good for us except by showing that it is bad for us.
Another possibility, compatible with that, would be to recognize that we rational beings, who are articulate about all this, endorse the goal of living a good life (that is, of living our sort of life well), and we have no more reason to do so than any other animal. Such an endorsement is simply our way of being alive. Life takes itself as a goal, and that is no accident: it is part of what it means to be alive (Korsgaard, 2018, section 8.6 ).
I realize that this raises many questions. I hope to answer them elsewhere.
For purposes of this paper, I'd like to stick to the metaphysical question whether, if
we could make such an account plausible, it would give us a naturalistic explanation of the good, in the sense of something's being good for someone in the final sense of good.
VI. Constructivism and the Problem of Valence
There is (at least) one more problem. I am proposing that we use the concept of the good, in the final sense of good, to indicate the solution to a Of course the way I just put that isn't quite right. It is not true that if nothing were better than anything else, you could just pick something, because you wouldn't have an array of options to choose from, or rather to pick among.
Something has to make the different things that we might aim at eligible to pursue in the first place in order to determine what the array of options is. 15 As I said before, the strength of the more 'naturalistic' theories of the good is that they start from the fact that certain things simply present themselves to us as eligible to be pursued.
But how do they present themselves that way? This, I think, is where we run into the most serious challenge for a naturalistic explanation of the good, which I will call the problem of valence. The problem is that an explanation of why there is such a thing as the good is almost certainly going to appeal to the fact that some Of course, hedonists don't propose to solve the problem of why there is such a thing as the good. Some of them think that pleasure just is the good, and pain just is the bad, and it is a little unclear why we should think so or how we know. But I believe that what makes the theory so perennially tempting is valence.
Pleasure and pain just seem to be essentially valenced experiences -in fact it seems as if their whole nature is given by their valence. Pleasure just is positive experience and pain just is negative experience. If you think that the capacity for a final good must have something to do with the character of experience, it is tempting to locate the good in an essentially positively valenced experience, and that is pleasure.
But even if hedonism is false, almost any account of why there is such a thing as the good is going to appeal to the idea that some things are positively valenced. As an example, consider T. M. Scanlon's 'buck-passing' account of the good (Scanlon 1998, chapter 2) . A buck-passer is someone who believes that to say that something is good is just to say that there are reasons to have certain attitudes towards it and treat it in certain ways. The fact that these reasons are of different kinds explains the fact that there are different kinds of value, calling for different responses from us. There are some things that there are reasons to promote, some things there are reasons to respect, some things there are reasons to admire, and so on. On this theory, the existence of the good can be explained, in terms of the existence of reasons. That is not a naturalistic explanation, perhaps, but it is an explanation. But there is still a problem, having to do with the distinction between good and bad. After all, a buck-passer about the good will also be a buck-passer about the bad: the bad too will involve having reasons to have certain attitudes towards things and treat them in certain ways. And since these reasons are also various in nature, we might wonder how the buck-passer is going to distinguish the good from the bad. To say either that something is good or that it is bad is to say that it generates a bunch of practical reasons, so how are the two ideas different?
What accounts for the positive valence of the good and the negative valence of the bad? In Scanlon's account, this problem appears to be passed on to the attitudes and actions for which there are reasons: to claim that something is good is to say there is reason to have positive attitudes and intentions towards it, while to say that something is bad is to say that there are reasons for negative attitudes and intentions. The attitudes and intentions are valenced. But the fact of valence itself remains unexplained.
Since we are not looking for a reductive account of the good, it is not a problem if we explain the existence of the good in terms of the fact that some things have a positive valence. But to prevent circularity we must then have an account of why things have positive or negative valences that does not in turn appeal to the existence of the good.
The solution to this problem, I believe, is, once again, to explain valence in terms of conscious action. Earlier I claimed that the good for an animal is the animal's functional good -the things that enable the animal to successfully live a life of her kind. Animals are 'designed' by the process of evolution to find the things that are functionally good for them attractive, and to find the things that are functionally bad for them aversive. In other words, animals are designed in such a way that they tend to take the things that are functionally good for them as final goods. The trick is to find a way to explain the fact that animals find certain things attractive or aversive without appealing to the idea that those things just seem good or bad to the animals themselves. Or rather, without saying that they seem pleasant or painful, where all that amounts to is a way of seeming good or bad.
Instead, I believe what we should say is that when an animal finds something attractive and is inclined to go for it, what is happening is that she is in fact experiencing herself going for it. Her pleasures and pains are her awareness of the operations of her impulses, or rather -to put it a better way -they are the animal's having these impulses consciously. realize it or make it keep going; negative valence is just the impulse to get away from something or try to prevent it or make it stop. Pleasure and pain are our consciousness of these tendencies: or rather, as I said before it is having these tendencies consciously. It is the action that is valenced, as a kind of going towards or away from, realizing or eliminating. These ideas are related to the ancient identification of the real and the good; on this picture, pleasure is movement towards being; pain is movement away from it. But these valences of action are experienced by animals who know what they are doing, or rather to the extent that they know what they are doing.
I realize one worry here is that this makes it sound as if pleasure and pain, or attraction and aversion, are epiphenomenal. The animal is already, as it were, starting to act, so what is their role? But here it is important to recall the selfmonitoring that is a feature of all action. Presumably, having the tendency to pursue something consciously enables the animal to exercise that tendency in a way that is more refined and responsive to the environment. On this view, an animal's experiencing attraction and aversion is experiencing herself trying to get or avoid something. It is a way of knowing what she is doing, and an animal who knows what she is doing will be better at doing it.
If something along these lines is right, we do not have to appeal to essentially valenced experiences in order to explain why there is such a thing as the good. We only need to appeal to the existence of conscious agents, who have some idea what they are doing. Attractions and aversion are just an animal's consciousness of her own attempts to live in the way characteristic of her kind, to realize her own sort of being. Having that consciousness makes her better at making those attempts. In our own case, that consciousness becomes articulate, which is why we face the problem of having to decide what to aim at and how.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper my aim has been to explore the prospects for giving a naturalistic explanation of why there is such a thing as the good, in the final sense of something's being good-for-someone. I have tried to sketch an explanation of the existence of the good in terms of the existence of conscious agency. Conscious agents, animals, are doing something already, namely living, and having a final good enables them to do that more effectively. Although it sounds odd to put it this way, having a final good is adaptive. I am painfully aware that my account has left many unanswered questions and that there are many places where it can be challenged. A great deal of work would have to be done to make this story plausible. But I think that there must be an explanation of why there is such a thing as the good, and since it is conscious agents who have a good, in the final sense of good, it seems to me that the best prospects for explaining the existence of the good is to appeal to requirements of conscious agency itself.
